

**The Anatomy of the Political Economy of Slow Genocide, and  
Organising of Racial Capitalism– A Tale of the Making of  
De Facto Stateless Rohingya**

First Author: Habiburahman  
Coordinator for Australia at Free Rohingya Coalition &  
Former Researcher at Monash University.  
Email: [habib.burmese@gmail.com](mailto:habib.burmese@gmail.com)

Fahreen Alamgir  
Senior Lecturer, Department of Management  
Monash Business School, Monash University  
email: [fahreen.alamgir@monash.edu](mailto:fahreen.alamgir@monash.edu)

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## Abstract

The paper discusses the political economy of genocide by exploring the organising of genocide against the world's largest de facto stateless community – the Rohingya community of Myanmar – over the past forty years. Amartya Sen categorises Rohingyas' experience of genocide as a slow genocide. His categorisation is borne out in our experience. To situate our understandings, we draw from Sanayal's arguments on the developmental state and the organisation of postcolonial capitalism. We argue that the core understanding of the political economy of slow genocide calls for the characterisation of genocide in relation to the capitalist formation of a developmental state and of particular social relations; this was conducted by organising the hierarchies of both civil and political societies as dominant and dominated factions within the project of the nation-state and nation-building. Examining the management of de facto stateless people reveals how substitutability evolves as a management strategy by the militarised form of the nation-state project. This strategy also characterises the politics of institutionalising and legitimising violence in the forms of expulsion, displacement, and death. Hence, we argue that the substitutability strategy is underpinned by the logic of extinction; thereby, this strategy institutionalises and legitimises violence in the forms of genocide. Thus, racial capitalism is organised and reconfigures the lives of minority communities in the context of the developmental states. Finally, we extend our debate by asking what role business academics should undertake in an increasingly corporatised academy in contemporary global capitalism.

*Keywords:* Slow genocide, Rohingya, stateless people, Myanmar, substitution, racial capitalism

*I think it is very important for institutionalised killing to be seen as genocide. This [the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar] is not like what happened in Rwanda or with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, or what happened in the Holocaust. You have denied peoples' health care, you have denied peoples' nutritional opportunity, you have denied peoples' opportunity to work and earn an income to make a living and to feed themselves and their family members, and you have denied them medical care [...]. This is killing people. In that sense, it is a genocide, and it is a slow genocide. [...] I think it is very important for institutionalised killing like this to be seen as genocide.*

–Amartya Sen (2014, November)

This paper focuses on the political economy of genocide experienced over the last 40 years by Myanmar's Rohingya community – the world's single largest de facto stateless community. Amartya Sen categorises their experience of genocide as a slow genocide which has been a debatable issue for the past 40 years. His remark points out the challenges embedded and embodied in recognising and representing an ongoing and slow genocide. As we relate our experience and observations directly to Sen's remark, we feel compelled to present what remains obscured about the management of the political economy of genocide. Therefore, we unpack the story of how the community has been ruled in contemporary nation-state projects that perpetuate genocide, whatever the form –slow, or direct. We question whether we can infer that central to understanding genocide is how the logic of elimination, expulsion, or eviction intricately interacts with the logic of extinction. Herein, a form of accumulation has been organised in two phases: first, by organising violence through displacement, and second, by managing deprivation of entitlements by setting the Rohingya community's identity as de facto stateless people – specifically as internally displaced people (IDP) of Myanmar. We argue that organising such prolonged genocide against the Rohingya community of Myanmar displays state-orchestrated organisation of racial capitalism.

We first outline our conceptual and contextual issues and challenges related to the topic and the case. Popular arguments related to genocide tend to follow both agency-oriented and structural approaches. The general trend suggests that to categorise genocide as a massacre, it must be demonstrated that direct killings have been organised based on categorical conditions. Accordingly, the format and script of representation undertake a standard narrative to transmit information regarding genocide (Galtung, 1990; Stokes and Gabriel, 2010). In parallel, 'genocide's crisis management strategies characterise the managing of social perceptions by involving civil society organisations (CSOs) such as NGOs, media, and intellectual actors, who could provide moral justifications if required, nationally and globally (Galtung, 1990). Therefore, regardless of how the process of organising genocide is evident at the local level, incidents to be acknowledged as genocide or humanitarian crises are contingent on approval by the global consensus (Galtung, 1990). Furthermore, acknowledgement of a humanitarian crisis like genocide has to pass the UN veto system. Finally, its orchestrated features should be aligned with the conditions delineated by the UN Convention on Genocide (Galtung, 1969; Stokes and Gabriel, 2010). In 1948, the United Nations codified the concept in its Genocide Convention, describing genocide as 'any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group' (1951: 280).

In our understanding, essential features of genocide experienced by the Rohingya community are deeply structured and systematically managed according to institutional norms. These strategies were organised structurally to first destroy the Rohingya community's identity as the ethnic minority community of Myanmar in 1974, and then their citizenship status by an enactment of the 1982 Citizenship Act. Since 1978, displacement has been a regular practice in the organising of Rohingya. Accordingly, they have been ruled through structural discrimination and deprivation. This structural discrimination is further evident in the recent Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State led by Kofi Annan (from now onward, "Commission"). The Report outlines that in Myanmar, Buddhists are the majority religious group, at 89% of the population, while 3% are Muslim. The Muslim Minority Rakhine community in camps for IDPs comprises 120,000 people (Commission, 2017:9). The Commission concludes that they constitute the single biggest stateless community in the world.

At the core of the system of organising slow genocide are the workings of the nation-state project and its legal regimes, which manage suspension of citizenship status and ethnic minority community identity, and lead them to become de facto stateless people and IDPs. Such organising modalities compel us to raise the following questions: does the centrality of the system of organising and managing indicate the loss of basic human requirements through managing entitlements and their capability? In line with Sanyal, should we assume that there has thus been an expulsion of the surplus population at the time of the 'emerging economy' phase in the developmental states (2007)? Drawing on those questions, we situate the case and our understanding of slow and ongoing genocide by outlining our conceptual and methodological approaches.

Our conceptual understandings draw from Sen's analytical framework on entitlements, rights, and capability (1999). This leads us to interrogate basic governance techniques linked with development-cum-managing-poverty under the nation-state structure. We also draw insights from Sanyal (2007) and Sarkar (2002) – postcolonial Marxist and Marxist- historical analysts – to situate our understanding about the case at the intersection of development regimes and the configuration of a developmental states' state apparatuses. Sanyal discusses how the organising mechanisms of development-cum-managing-poverty (i) undertake a strategy of sanction and suspension of entitlements; and expulsion, and (ii) thus, create a 'surplus' population. Herein a process of accumulation is grounded. He suggests that in orthodox Marxist analyses, capitalistic accumulation is linked with producing a surplus in materialistic value, which is not evident in deriving accumulation by creating a surplus population (2007). Influenced by Sanyal (2007), Sarkar (2002), and Chatterjee (2011), we conceptualise the political economy of slow and ongoing genocide, focusing on communities' competing identities and their felt entitlements as political society. Drawing on how the exception of norms as a governing strategy invokes the idea of substitutability, we interrogate the concept of organising genocide by focussing on the taxonomy of political society. The concept of the nation implies that there are permanent majority factions (Sarkar, 2002). However, we argue that a substitution occurs. The logic of substitution entails conditions of managing perceptions, and produces social-ethical compliance in order to legitimise the denying of entitlements or the organising of hierarchies within the nation. Thus, by denying minority communities' entitlements, the dominant and dominated factions of the political society are organised (Sarkar,2002). Finally, we argue that substitutability as a mode of management demarcates the organisation of racial capitalism under the nation-state project of developmental states. This is done through reconfiguring peoples' lives regardless of the political regime, and how conflicting these political regimes are, whether in militarised form, or in transition to democracy.

Spivak (Oxford, 2016, May 16) challenges scholars to confront the modalities that dominate social sciences but fail to incorporate either Rohingyas' experience of genocide specifically, or indeed any generally organised violence against specific groups. Because of the liberal terms, the social science knowledge regime is predicated on neutrality to comply with the condition of legitimacy. Thus, the research protocols and categories are delineated to decontextualise the knowledge. Our challenge is therefore to establish our claim by representing our lived experience of genocide. We place our relational engagement – our concerns and mutual trust – at the core to outline our ways of knowing. We draw from the transnational feminist scholars' corpus to outline our analytical framework (Nagar, 2014; Sangtin and Nagar, 2006). Our sense of responsibility is invoked by relating our identity and positionality: as a Rohingya – a genocide survivor, refugee, and activist – and as a Bangalee, naturalised Australian citizen, and academic. Our concerns emanate from our shared historical, geographical, and anthropological trajectories between Bangla and the Rakhine state, which used to be acknowledged as Arakan. Our analytical framework is outlined by our shared colonial and racially politicised history and geography and our current concerns. Indeed, the historical trajectory is worth noting as Sen's statement also demarcates the given geography of genocide. As researchers, our accountability is by how explicitly we show how we make our claims and for whom.

What is transportable out of our study of business studies? Here we emphasise what evokes our sense of felt responsibility, given that 82 million forcibly displaced people are located in states where they cannot access the most basic human requirements and forms of governance (Bache, 2017). Perhaps now it is worth noting that Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions suggests that bringing conflict sensitivity into inclusive business practices is a requirement in the context of rising inequality and racial-ethnic geopolitical tensions. Here, we think our paper makes the following three contributions. First, it presents a framework on the political economy of slow and ongoing genocide by outlining accumulation by pauperisation via the workings of the nation-state project. Thus, our study strengthens our understanding regarding the organisation of racial capitalism during 'developmental' and 'emerging economy' phases in the case of developmental states. Second, by illustrating the taxonomy of political society, the paper revisits institutional and organisational mechanisms to show how violence has been structured through systemising deprivations and displacement, and offers discussion of how business can play a role in managing a liveable life for the people. We argue that strategic interventions through corporate social responsibility (CSR), particularly political CSR, increasingly occupy an important space in business studies (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Matten and Crane, 2005). Additionally, the condition of legitimacy predominantly links CSR initiatives with the SDGs. Therefore, we should explore the stakeholders' perspective in line with the idea of political society (Mir and Greenwood, 2020). Considering the people living in camps, whose citizenship status has been suspended, the interface between the concept of legitimacy and the stakeholder has immense importance. Finally, by emphasising what it means to have a human life, our study appeals to scholars to consider making their arguments more relevant when revisiting political CSR theories.

The paper is structured as follows. The following section discusses the intersection of development regimes and the management of political economy through managing poverty, which can best be described as an organisation of racial militarised capitalism within the postcolonial-developmental states. It is followed by a discussion on managing political society. We then present our modalities of conceptualising slow and ongoing genocide. We base our analyses on how the logic of elimination and expulsion interfaces with extinction and thereby

substitutability evolves as a strategy of managing slow and ongoing genocide against a minority ethnic community – the Rohingya community – and organises racial capitalism. Finally, we conclude our discussion with some notes on what role business can play in the political realm to unlock the potential of the stateless people and thereby reimagine the political society beyond the nation-state.

### **The intersection of Development Regimes, Political Economy Management, and Organisation of Racial Capital**

Writing in the discipline of business studies, Banerjee (2008, 2011) introduces necrocapitalism and internal colonialism as ideas to analyse the conditions and modalities of various modes of accumulation by organising dispossession and violence under contemporary global capitalism. He examines the political economy of resource extraction management practices in the name of development through the suspension of law and deployment of state apparatuses. According to Banerjee, the logic of elimination, exclusion, and expulsion is integral to the management principle. This has perpetuated internal colonialism for ethnic minority and indigenous communities. Banerjee (2011, p. 325) further suggests that here military strength works as the factor enabling the state to orchestrate violence against the indigenous and ethnic communities; hence he questions liberal values by asking in what way democracy is serving these communities.

In a similar vein, a group of scholars has used the notion of an emerging economy and the military's involvement in politics as the base of political-economic analysis to investigate Myanmar's global economic integration, by situating the state within the ASEAN regional alliance (Huang, 2013; Jones, 2014; Wood 2011). This group of scholars unpacks the dynamics of the military and business nexuses in implementing economic reforms into the 'socialist' structure of society. They reveal that such reforms demonstrate how transnational capital networks have appropriated insurgencies organised by other ethnic minorities. They argue that the nexus between Chinese corporate investments and military-private partnerships is deemed the condition of development. Such development actions resulted in doubling Myanmar's army's size from 1988–2007 and exceeding US\$2 billion in arms imports to satisfy the civil-army factions (Huang, 2013; Jones, 2014; Wood 2011). In Myanmar's transition to democracy from 2010 to 2015, political reforms have occurred in line with the military's version of democracy. Retired Bamar (male military officers) have become reorganised through the political parties who have networks with clerics/monks and media (Jones, 2014a; Jones, 2014b, Wood 2011). Thus, these groups function and mediate between military tycoons, military-civil bureaucracy, political parties, business, and civil society actors including intellectuals, to manage public perceptions. It is worth noting that business is organised such that competing demands of and disputes among ethnic minority communities are realised based on the nexus between political leaders and clerics, who have authority over the dominant communities as part of political society (Brenner, 2015 Jones, 2014a;). Invariably through them, ultra-Buddhist nationalist narratives are endorsed and patronised.

Our insights suggest that the above analyses communicate what is globally understood, which is that dispossession may be understood by focusing on the capitalist accumulation of a corporatised economy (Malešević, 2017). The pattern is to generalise and homogenise crucial local politico-economic and cultural aspects relating to organising dispossession and violence. Equally, we observe silence about: the emergence of a militarised form of capitalism in the case of both socialist and democratic forms of the nation-state project; the capacity under which such administrative apparatuses have been organised so that extreme poverty has been

structured; and how the managing of poor ethnic communities is to be viewed. Most importantly, we are concerned with why such militarised state projects became essential, and how corresponding social compliance is managed for legal and economic reforms that constitute violence.

Drawing from studies by Marxist analysts Amin (1976,1997) and Alavi (1973), we examine how global militarism that intends to expand capitalism has been structured within state disciplinary apparatuses. These authors argue that interacting with global capital initially defined the essence of development under the state-building project in the case of developmental states, or precisely in postcolonial states. Correspondingly, this 'state's citizenship-based' structure has centralised the capitalist structure by centralising power in the hands of the military and civil bureaucracy, if required through militarising the political regimes (Alavi, 1973). Unrelentingly, conditions of capitalistic development have been organised to delineate poor ethnic-minority communities by organising their displacement (Amin,1997). This has been strategically entangled with the resettlement process of the majority factions of communities. Displacement, along with denial of endowments and entitlements, have been organised through racial engineering, drawing on colonially produced knowledge on race and ethnicity.

In parallel, social compliance has also been methodically organised; development assistance also had a soft part. Hence, aid as an investment has been deployed to develop tertiary educational institutions' capacity, and to establish think tanks. Thus, knowledge has been produced to shape the people's cultural subjectivity and consequently legitimise brutal repressions by military invasions (Barros & Taylor, 2018). Such regimes of produced knowledge are invoked by rules, doctrines, regulations, policies, norms, perceptions, and rituals, in order to manage social-ethical compliance (Barros and Taylor, 2018; Kumar, 2019). Indeed, the deployed ways and means of managing compliance tend to indicate the political nature of CSOs such as the universities and NGOs.

We perceive a peculiar awkward nexus between liberal values, the nation-state project, and various forms of its political regimes in developmental states such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and to some extent, India. In the cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh, militarised regimes or militarised forms of democracy are outcomes of a political-economic management strategy (Alavi,1973). In the case of India, in 1977, a declaration of a 'state of emergency' indicated an arrangement – a mutual adjustment – between the populist government and the state apparatuses (Drèze and Sen, 2013). Myanmar neither pursued demolition of the right to private property, nor did it de-link from the strategy of global capital. We can say that, in general, militaristic authoritarianism has/had been at the core of the regimes of development. Here, militarised ideology has indoctrinated cultural segregations drawing on crises and conflicts managed by brutal domination.

So far, we have discussed the paradoxical features in the workings of the nation-state. Such features demonstrate arranging deprivation and disparity in multiple structural phases (territorial and institutional) and demarcate how capitalist development organises social relations and racial capital. Within such contextual terrain, we situate our case and our line of analysis – how a specific community has been governed – in order to unravel the nature of accumulation, and thus to illustrate the political economy of slow genocide.

## The Political Economy of Slow Genocide

We have outlined the intimate connections within the militarised form of the nation-state project and how despotic regimes have accelerated conditions, assumptions, and concerns for capitalist development-cum-managing-poverty in developmental states. Our research tends to diverge from the standard categorisation of genocide and leads us to elaborate a collection of elements focusing on what governments actually govern when it comes to people.

The core understanding of liberal conceptions of political values draws on two key concepts – nation and citizens – to ground its abstract understandings of rights and equality (Sarkar, 2002). Both notions, nation and citizen, tend to collapse in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender, but the moral intent of liberal notions remains secured. To give it a concrete structure, that is, to make accessible what the nation-state system promises to the people, Sen introduces twin ideas: entitlements and capabilities (1999). These ground the analytical foundation of his capability perspective and show how social protection can be shaped when the expansion of capability is contingent on an individual's entitlements, specifically their political entitlements (1999).

Since violence becomes a pattern by systematising inequality via the workings of the nation-state project, we argue that we should recast our views about liberal assumptions. We find the needed clarity from postcolonial political literature. Insights drawn from this corpus illuminate how the nation-state operates, drawing on the notion of substitutability (Chatterjee, 2011, Chatterjee and Sanyal, 2016). Indeed, the logic of substitutability is distinctive in liberal values and, therefore, in its concepts (Mamdani, 2020). However, paradoxical features embodied in liberal concepts remain obfuscated because the governing technique is to organise exceptions to norms (Chatterjee and Sanyal, 2016). The nation as a concept is instrumentally inclined towards the majority, and any needed social-legal reforms can be instituted by drawing on identity – simultaneously protecting the majority's interest (Sarkar, 2002). Colonial surveys and censuses have already catalogued people as communities in terms of their race, religion, caste, and ethnicity. The notion of identity was primarily deployed as a project to structure historical social-cultural polarities, thus entrenching tension concerning intersectionality (Sarkar, 2002). To counter that, Sen stresses that identity should be viewed as a right – in terms of how an individual/community would like to be recognised.

In contrast, broader politico-administrative regimes are supported by majoritarian cultural-religious values (Sarkar, 2002). These regimes tend to fix the boundary of the singular identity of the communities drawing on their religion and ethnicity. Therefore instituting exceptions to norms has been a trend as a means of setting the terms of entitlements to materialise access to and provision of entitlements for majority and minority communities (Chatterjee, 2011). To expose that inherent undercurrent, postcolonial scholars draw on the notion of political society, which emphasises the competing aspects of representation focussing on heterogeneity in social subcategories (Chatterjee, 2011; Chatterjee and Sanyal, 2016). They argue that political society as a category offers to reflect on the workings of governing, where organised contestations evidence the existence of dominant and dominated factions.

According to Sanyal, the gain in entitlements of one community implies expansion of its people's capabilities, but this occurs at the loss of others' (2007). He argues that reducing the capabilities of a specific community or group of communities through managing their entitlements organises their expulsion from the dominant formal economy as a surplus population. Basically, under the development-cum-poverty-management technique, the state manages basic entitlements, such as employment, education, health care, housing or shelter,



and food. Thus, the functioning of capitalist development creates a space outside the boundary of capital where deprivation and disparity are negotiated, drawing on criteria such as class, ethnicity, caste, religion, and gender. According to traditional Marxist analysis, accumulation of surplus occurs by organising dispossession. Sanyal argues that a form of organising of accumulation occurs through structuring deprivation and disparity of basic capability requirements of specific groups of people (2007). On one hand, there is a mechanism of protecting the opportunity to expand the capability of the privileged category of people or communities. On the other, disadvantaged communities lose their access to the means of labour and are unable to sell their labour power because of capability deprivation (2007). Such a form of accumulation exemplifies Marx's concept of the organisation of plundering (1973). According to Marx, organising plundering involves reducing basic human requirements to crude human needs, with the result that the only concern that occupies people's minds is survival (1973).

Thus, substitutability as a strategy materialises a method of managing the political economy through crystallising the dynamics of relations among various political society factions. As a political strategy, it displays the organising of deprivation of capability through manipulating political and cultural identity. Hence, a question arises: whether accumulation through capability deprivation is the consequence of competing demands of dominated and dominant factions of the political society, or does it demonstrate plundering, where accumulation for dispossession cannot always be entangled with capitalistic purpose.

So far, we have discussed the working of the nation-state project, drawing on its key concepts: nation, citizenship status, and entitlements. We have unpacked how deprivation and disparity are socially structured, focusing on specific groups of people based on their identity as a community or as a class. Influenced by Sen (2005), Sanyal (2007), and Sarkar(2002), our core understanding of the political economy of ongoing genocides calls for its characterisation concerning capitalist development-cum-poverty-management, and formation of particular social relations by organising political societies into factions: elite, dominant and privileged; or dominated. Thus, we conceptualise what may be the format and methods of organising slow and ongoing genocide. The Rohingyas' experience of genocide highlights the mechanisms of the political and social arrangements that are being organised, drawing on conditions, assumptions, and perceptions to exert the logic of claim-making to manage sanctions, suspension, and displacement. The following section discusses that modalities that may be deployed to present Rohingyas' experience of genocide, and how it has been consolidated, sustained, and legitimised.

### **Modalities of Organising Ongoing Genocide: Managing by Constituting and Substituting Perceptions**

We face two challenges in presenting the reality of our lived experience of genocide: first, what modalities we need to deploy to present our experience of slow and ongoing genocide; and second, how to uncover the workings of state apparatuses that govern genocidal incidents.

In addressing genocide, the question of equity emerges regarding how we develop and situate our understandings. As a Rohingya and genocide survivor, I [from here on, discussion in the first person implies the First Author – Ro-FA] feel challenged as I see the difference between what we experience, and the image we see – that is, the interpretation and presentation of our experience of survival. It is challenging to demonstrate relevance if I narrate that my father wanted me to be a lawyer because he thought that knowing the law was very important for

Type	Description of sources	Analyses
Secondary	Academic sources (2003-2017)	Comprehensive content analysis of issues over 40 years looking patterns, dominant debates and themes of -Legal reforms and organizing regimes to constitute the de facto stateless and IDPs -Methods deployed for manufacturing conceptions and managing perception in relation to practices, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Erasure of ethnic minority community identity</li> <li>• Suspension of citizenship status – the political identity</li> <li>• Sanctioned, suspension and annihilation of entitlements</li> <li>• Deprivation, dispossession, displacement and death</li> </ul>
	Civil society actors’ organised research reports and studies (2017-2019)	
	Newspapers published reports (2017-2019)	
	Electronic sources from organised seminars (2010-2019)	
	Books: Ronan Lee (2021) Habiburahman (2019) Rajib Nur (2019)	
Primary	Grounding our common understandings to navigate the terrain and experience as a genocide survivor (2017-2020)	

Rohingyas, as the legal reforms had changed our lives completely. But his dream remains unfulfilled, as life has not yet given me the opportunity to pursue his dream. My father wanted us to be educated, so my family moved from one place to another to avoid living in camps. We all have Burmese names to manage admission into school. But how could we change our how we look ? The truth is that our body embodies our history of oppression; we are commonly acknowledged as ‘Kalar’ – a derogatory term generally used by the Burmese to express disgust for the dark-skinned ethnic groups who have Indian facial appearance. Our life is organised and decided by our various given state-crafted identities, including the UN. and its sister organisations, such as the IOM [International Organisation for Migration] and the UNHCR.

We are identified as the following: IDPs; the stateless people; Muslim migrants; the Muslim minority community from Myanmar; and as having’ irregular to illegal maritime arrival’ in Australia. Currently, around 3000 Rohingya refugees are in Australia, mainly under temporary visa status with limited provisions. Our lives are regulated; nevertheless, regimes and the patterns of regulation are similar wherever we are. For instance, no matter where we are located, there are restrictions and sanctions on our movements; moreover, we are not allowed to work, to have a livelihood, or to access education and healthcare facilities. Deprivation and disparity of basic human requirements is our reality. Our challenge in this knowledge-making process is to integrate that reality as the outcome of the slow and ongoing genocide.

With this context, we situate our approach analyses and draw from the following sources; Table 1: Data Sources: Constitution of De Facto Stateless People and Organising Genocide.

Influenced by transnational feminist we emphasise our situated solidarity to clarify, interpret, develop, and present our shared understandings of genocide (Nagar, 2014; Sangtin and Nagar,2006).

The situated solidarity emanates from the radicalising of our collaboration progress since 2017 to navigate the uneven terrain of the knowledge process in seeking justice (Nagar,2006).

**Table 1**

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Therefore, it is crucially important what ways and means we use in the process of seeking justice, and for which is laid out as research. However, the research path is hegemonic, as argued by transnational feminists scholar such as Chatterjee.Piya (2006) and Nagar (2014) . These scholars emphasise the value of broadening our scope by shifting our views from categorisations to our experience – how we relate and what resonates in us based on our shared concerns (Chatterjee, Piya, 2006 and Nagar, 2014) This method opens up possibilities as it asks us to recast our views on the intersection of our historical, political, social, and economic trajectories of institutional and social power and practices and on the interfaces of these practices and their implications in our lived experience. By emphasising vulnerability, transnational and indigenous feminist scholars encourage us to radicalise our process of knowing, and to constitute our arguments by grounding our situated identity in what we have experienced (Sangtin and Nagar, 2006).

We reflect on our identity and positionality in basing our understandings. As we mentioned at the outset of the paper, we take account of our privileges, paradoxes, and plights as our relationship traverses multiple social divides. Being located in Australia, we keep exploring wherein our accountability is grounded. As we relate more, our emergent insights are revelatory. Here, a minority ethnic community member who experienced violent erasure of his ethnic and political identity relates with a person (the second author) whose ethnic identity as Bangalee and Banglaee Muslim in Bangladesh matches the national identity or nationality of the majority


faction. The scepticism and fractured trust are ingrained when Bangladesh is the only state officially responsible for almost one million Rohingya refugees.

Let us illustrate this with a few examples. The first author's recently published book invoked a felt responsibility in the second author (SA) to publish a review of the book in the leading Bangla online newspaper. What motivated us is to introduce Rohingyas' lifeworld to Bangladesh and Rohingyas living in camps located in Bangladesh. Our terms are being fixed and refixed, drawing on our immediate concerns and experience. We discuss our experience of military invasions and the militarisation process. Our discussions bring to light how militarised ideology has been embodied in complex innovations focussing on identity and citizenship politics, which have been integral to the current sectarian politics in South Asia. Finally, we try to connect within these how political-economic workings are materialised.

As we relate more, deep reciprocity is reflected in our debates. Our discussions centre on life in camps as displaced persons, which involves discussions around having access to education and works no matter where a genocide survivor is located. We often talk about the role of business, the states, the UN, and the universities in the Australian context and interfaces of these institutions with political societies – specifically with refugees. The terms and conditions of these institutions tend to be inimically narrowed as the practice shows –who has access, why, and how-to education generally, and then to the university's education, and through these Universities, the capability development initiatives under the AUSAID Projects are arranged drawing on nationality. As we reflect more, we notice that the workings of substitution logic are founded on the authentic identity of refugees as the category. Thus fundamental governance issues for refugees are being organised in Europe, Asia, Australia, and the Arab world. Hence refugees with Arab ethnic backgrounds are regarded as 'authentic Muslims' because of the geographical origin of the religion. Reciprocation of that perception is marked in Australians' ways of dealing with Muslim diaspora communities. Nevertheless, Rohingyas' official recognition in Australia as Muslim refugees from Myanmar is regarded as their symbolic victory. Indeed, they are officially recognised in Australia and thus globally in a manner that focuses on where they belong – Myanmar. Eventually, in 2019-2020 our conversations shifted to India's current National Register of Citizens policy and its implications for the Muslims living in Assam. We see broad commonalities between its features and processes and the Citizenship Act of Myanmar, since at its core is the displacement of people from the land with which they have anthropological connection. Our annoyance led to us engaging in crucial assessments regarding the lack of substantial reflective reasoning in international measures, including the UN and thereby the UNHCR, in addressing issues relating to the making of stateless people. Their standard protocol is to address secondary solutions such as refugee settlements in other countries, rather than create pressure on its member states to solve the issue from the roots. The logic of substitution directs the solutions onto the secondary problems instead of creating pressure for permanent solutions.

Drawing on our terms, thus, our situated solidarity is formed. Our reflexive analysis forms the basis for ethically navigating terrains like genocide without lumping this into discussions of concepts and categories of genocide. The process is transparent and illustrative as we outline our collective understandings of genocide and its political-economic consequences. Figure 1 illustrates how we ground our situated solidarity.

**Figure 1**  
*Situated Solidarity*



Our second challenge is to uncover and examine what makes genocide doable and what governs incidences of genocide. Insights drawn from Mamdani’s intensive research on genocide make it explicit that people are displaced in order to be disconnected from the land and its history (2002,2020). This invokes an understanding that identity is a project. The project is intricately linked with the logic of elimination – for the minority ethnic communities to destroy their histories. Thus, Mamdani disrupts the liberal understanding that identity is a natural construct and further elucidates how legitimacy is managed for the state orchestrated invasions for the authenticity of identity. In Table 2. we synthesise insights from Mamdani with comments and perspectives from Sen, Spivak, and Rohingya activists, including the first author. Thus, we derive the patterns of what they have emphasised, and where we need to recast our views.

**Table 2**  
*Key Derived Patterns and Themes to Analyse, Develop and Situate our Understandings on slow and Ongoing Genocide*

Illustrative quotes and headlines	Themes
<p>‘This [the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar] is not like what happened in Rwanda or with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, or what happened in the Holocaust. There are some elements [...] when we talk about [slow] genocide, it reminds me that along with six million Jews, three million Gypsies died too. You have denied peoples’ health care, you have denied peoples’ nutritional opportunity, you have denied peoples’ opportunity to work and earn an income to make a living and to feed themselves and their family members, and you have denied them medical care [...]. Rohingya suffer pain, suffer degradation and suffer from leading a life that no human being should be living. This is killing, and in that sense, it is a genocide, and it is a slow genocide. [...]. I think it is very important for institutionalized killing like this to be seen as genocide. [...] Here the question arises about the definitional problem [for a situation or case to be regarded as genocide]. (Sen, Harvard, November 2014)</p> <p>Sen emphasizes the importance of unmasking the technique of managing false perceptions, misconceptions, and misinformation by reinventing history to justify and legitimize such killing to challenge the politics of acknowledging genocide.</p>	<p>Interfaces between the logic of elimination and extinction</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organizing of entitlement failure and denial to live</li> <li>- Cultivating suspicion and grounding singular identity</li> <li>- Annihilating Rohingyas’ right to participate in social-cultural dynamics</li> <li>- Constituting de facto stateless people</li> </ul>

<p>‘There is a different call - do we need to think about and wait for scientific research to call it a genocide? When accepting wretchedness is normalized. It is our obligation to mention this unacceptable crime [violence against the Rohingya community] is genocide, and genocide is going on everywhere]. Expand your identity work and make it global. Identity group research and politics that time is over, and let us be global. [...] Global means coming out with global epistemology’.</p> <p>‘One has to be able to understand that to be equal is not to be the same [...]’.</p> <p>(Spivak,- Oxford, 11 May 2016)</p>	<p>Situated solidarity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Building trust and uniting our fractured trust</li> <li>- Compulsion to respond</li> <li>- Felt responsibility</li> <li>- Reciprocity</li> <li>- Seeking justice in the knowledge process is an ongoing project</li> </ul>
<p>The deliberate attacks on the conditions of life, such as: ‘assaulting of identity; killings; causing physical and mental harm, and organizing the conditions of life to prevent birth and restrict marriage; no provisions of work; restrictions on mobility; and no access to education are the ways the life of the Rohingya community living in camps are managed (Zarni and Cowley, 2014, p. 683).).</p>	<p>Categorically defining:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Rohingyas’ experience of slow genocide</li> <li>-That Rohingyas’ experience of genocide has been a contested topic</li> </ul>
<p>‘1982, they stripped out our citizenship and made us stateless. [...]. Violence became instrumental, [...] a new apartheid system has been introduced from 2010. [...] in three years, there has been no aid in the camps. This is genocide – when I do not exist’ (Ro Tun Khin Oxford, 11 May 2016)</p>	<p>Life in camps and organizing of slow and ongoing genocide</p> <p>Rohingyas’ experience of genocide has been a contested topic</p>
<p>Massive attacks from June 2012 have wiped out 90% of the Rohingya population [...], permanently trapping about 150,000 people into concentration camps and systematically confining the remaining people, followed by blocking aid and ration supplies [...]. Hence, the discriminatory laws; rigid confinement and restriction, including segregation and the creation of Muslim-free zones, cutting off electricity and water; and permanent barriers in every sector – social, cultural, welfare, healthcare, education, and livelihood. These comprise very clear evidence of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity’</p> <p>(Ro-FA, July 2018).</p>	<p>Rohingyas’ experience of genocide</p>
<p>‘Refugee life is slightly better off than death. Life in camps resembles a zinda-lash [living-death]’</p> <p>(Ali Zohar [A 65-year-old Rohingya male living in a camp in Cox’s Bazar, as cited in Nur, 2018, p. 81).</p>	<p>Life in camps</p>

Sen’s comment clearly implies that the construction of truth has been deployed as a method to substitute/replace actual history, instances, and views that combine the anthropological trajectory of a community. He holds that racialised ways of seeing or perceptions remain at the core of the identity project. Therefore, Spivak appeals for global solidarity among researchers to develop a global understanding of genocide and crimes against humanity by questioning liberal values relating to identity, equality, and equity.

Our situated solidarity is essential in defining the premise of our analyses. We envisage that our collective past evolves through an intersection with people’s mobility and cultural

exchange, and later through particular institutions and norms that are a result of colonial legacy and the nation-state and nation-building project. It is not surprising that famine and genocides have similar political geography and historical-political economic trajectories (Sen,1999). Such strong similarities help us directly relate our concerns on the modalities of genocide with Sen's decades-long research trajectory on the modalities of famine. Sen emphasises interfaces of the state structure, and its norms relating to the right to recognition – that is, what reinforces and demarcates an individual's entitlement, specifically her ability to claim her identity (1999,2005). For Rohingya, their right to claim their ethnic identity has been lost by the revoking of the historical, anthropological, social, and cultural exchange that could be traced between the state of Arakan/Rakhine state and the state of Bengal since the twelfth century of the Mughal dynasty (Nur, 2018).

Our conceptual framework shows the intrinsic relevance of synthesising our history, politics, and displacement. Thus. it broadens the scope of our situated understandings regarding the question of what makes slow and ongoing genocide doable. Insights drawn from our analyses show that substitutability evolves as a strategy that interfaces with the logic of elimination, eviction, and extinction. As a principle of managing the nation, substitution is entangled with and can obfuscate the extinction logic that destroys the capability and capacity of a specific group of people.

Using our outlined analytical framework, we disentangle the conditions that organise multiple modes of management centering on the lives of the stateless people for forty years in three useful ways. First, we infer how substitutability as a strategy illustrates the intersection of the logic of elimination and eviction with extinction: the capability of a minority faction is managed by categorising them as IDPs, refugees, or undocumented people (quote 3 & 4). Second, we gather why current analyses related to the atrocities against the Rohingya from 2017 predominantly consider Myanmar's geopolitical position within the East Asian regional geopolitical context. Such studies simplify Myanmar's politico-economic and cultural regimes as a socialist military polity, as a state that is in transition to democracy, and as a state that follows the strict scripts of Buddhist philosophy. Third, the logic of substitutability is inherently linked with cultural-political identity, using concepts such as nation, citizen, and ethnic community. For the Rohingya, substitutability evolves as a management procedure that organises their disconnection from the land and annihilates the right to reclaim it. Here the process of displacement and substitution of land and home with camps, and constitution of their singular identity as the minority Muslims of the state of Rakhine, indicate how management by substitution works using the logic of elimination, expulsion, and then extinction.

In the next section, we discuss the management of the economy and forms of representation of these suspended lives, and how racial capitalism is organised.

### **The Political Economy of Managing Genocide and Organising Racial Capitalism**

Central to our understanding is how the logic of elimination and eviction interfaces with substitution as a management principle, thereby legitimising extinction by organising slow and ongoing genocide. Here the Commission (2017) further exposes that the members –IDPs of the Rakhine state – have been living in camps and lack freedom of movement, and therefore, access to sources of their livelihood (2017). Moreover, the Commission stresses the management of economic outcomes of the marginalised communities by clearly indicating that managing such arrangements rest with the civil-army factions and foreign companies.

Within this context, we investigate first: how genocide has been socially structured and how it has reconfigured the Rohingya community's life; second, how the management of political society relates to the management of political economy, and organisation and consolidation of a racial economy and thereby racial capitalism. Table 3 presents the trajectory of regimes, reconfigurations of Rohingyas' lifeworld, and management of politico-economic conditions in the state of Rakhine from 1948–2018.

**Table 3**

*Trajectory of Regimes Reconfiguring the Rohingya Community's Life Managing Political-Economic Conditions in the state of Rakhine 1948-2020*

Year	Events and legal reforms	Changes in the political and economic condition in Rakhine state, Myanmar, and the Rohingya community
1824–26	First British-Burma War	
1948	Burma gained independence A survey by the British government listed 135 ethnic groups as ethnic minority communities of Myanmar and excluded the Rohingya community from this list	The Rohingya recognised as the ethnic, national group of Myanmar Nationalization of land
1959	Operation Shwe Kyi (Pure Gold)	
1962	Army took over political power	Nationalisation of industrial sectors
1962-74	1966: Operation for Myat Mon (More purity) 1967–73: Operation Major Aung Than (Millions of Successes) and Sabae (Purify and Whiten Like the Jasmine Flower) 1974: Enforcement of Emergency Migration Act	Loss of identity as Rohingya Rohingya re-identification as the Muslim minority community of Rakhine state Resettlement of Rakhine Buddhist community
1978-79	Operation Dragon King and implementation of Emergency Migration Act	200,000–250,000 Rohingya refugees fled to Bangladesh
1982	Enactment of the Citizenship Act Initiating citizenship verification process Issuance of National Registration Certificate (NRC)	Foreign Registration Certificate issued to Rohingyas Constitution of the de facto stateless community - the Rohingya
1989 -90	Issuance of “Citizenship Scrutiny Cards“ instead of NRC.	In 1989 the Arakan state renamed Rakhine State Initiation of ‘Model Village’ - <i>NaTaLa</i> - a settlement program for Rakhines on land confiscated from Rohingyas Lands were seized and replaced by Navy camps, military camps, Golf Mart, Buddhist Museum and cultural museums
1990-95	1991 Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation	Initiation of economic reforms



	Temporary Registration Card issued to repatriated Rohingyas from Bangladesh	More than 250,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. India investment in constructing the deep-sea port project
2010-15	Transition to democracy –de facto political power in Myanmar held between Army and the political parties Revoking of policy of issuing Temporary Registration Card Issuance of national verification cards to verify undocumented non-citizens; Rohingyas are not covered by it.	The era of ceasefire capitalism Allocations of 17,000 acres for economic development and the military has de facto control over land Almost 168,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. An estimated 112,500 of them risked their lives on smugglers’ boats in the Bay of Bengal to reach Malaysia New Foreign Investment law allows for 100% foreign capital investments
2015-16	Aung San Suu Kyi’s party’s electoral victory	Allocation of three million acres of Rakhine rural land for economic development
2018	400,000 Rohingya moved to Bangladesh 120,000 Rohingyas are confined to IDP camps 9000 (adult) people died	India invested around US\$484 million in the Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project China built a deep-sea water port, a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), and an oil and gas pipeline in Rakhine state Agreement with the Vietnamese Agricultural Ministry on a 120,000-acre rubber plantation Foreign direct investment in the sector of oil/gas extraction totalling US\$7.5 billion 25 oil and gas fields are situated in Rakhine state Allocation of 20,000 hectares for industrial crop cultivation for a maximum 30-year lease Allocation of 1252 acres to 14 companies for the large-scale commercial financing
1978-2020	43,000 people were killed 900,000 Rohingya now living in camps in Bangladesh	Foreign Direct Investment: Singapore USD \$ 161,144 million China USD 133.531 million Thailand USD 24,103 Malaysia USD \$2,100 million India (from 1988/89 to 2018): USD\$ 763.567 million India is also Myanmar’s one of the top arms suppliers. Australian support in defence sector USD\$ 30 million The ILO lifted its embargo and launched its Decent Work Country Program for 2018-2021.
2021-	In February, Army again seized power	

	and ousted the government led by Aung San Suu Kyi's political party National League for Democracy (NLD)	
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As illustrated in Table 3, our analyses show that following Myanmar's independence, its nationalist-populist government nationalised agricultural land and considered the Rohingya community an ethnic-national community of Myanmar. Thus, the state's commitments towards grounding equity and equality in social formations characterised the newly independent state Burma. The first phase of military intervention in 1962 instituted a new form of racialised geopolitics based on the British government's 1948 census. This census identified and categorised 135 ethnic-minority groups but excluded the Rohingya community from the list (Aung, 2017; Loose, 2013). By 1974, army regimes had operationalised the Emergency Migration Act, and accordingly, 'Rohingya' identification or their identity as the Rohingya community was removed from official use. This was followed by the enactment of the Citizenship Act (1982), where the year 1823 – the year prior to the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-26) – was endorsed as the cut-off year for determining 'genuine' Burmese identity. Correspondingly the Act revoked Rohingyas' rights and entitlements as citizens of Myanmar based on arguments that they entered Myanmar after the war began in 1824. All these legal reforms were followed by the organising of military operations like Pure Gold (1959), Dragon King (1974), More Purity (1966), Purify and Whiten like the Jasmine Flower (1967-73), and Clean and Beautiful Nation (1991) (Habiburahman and Ansel, 2019).

In essence, militarism and militarised ideology have internalised colonially-produced, socio-cultural knowledge on race, religion, and ethnicity. The condition of extreme nationalism tended to combine with the communities' religious identity to set assumptions about identity. Accordingly, the knowledge has been formed to shape people's political and cultural subjectivity through the substitution of collective perceptions and history. Alternatively, racial-communal ideology has been solidified by setting singular identities like Bamar and Buddhists first, then Rakhine Buddhists, and finally, the image of a state that follows strictly Buddhist scripts. In tandem, suspicion has been entrenched against the Rohingya community by cultivating a singular identity as illegal Muslim migrants from Bangladesh or Bengali invaders (Aung, 2017). Accordingly, the despotic regime has managed the consent required from the dominant factions in grounding its legitimacy. Hence since 1978, as de facto stateless people, the Rohingya community has been compelled to live in camps as IDP in Bangladesh and as IDP/ Muslim minority community and categorically as illegal migrants of Bangladesh in Myanmar. Organising violence became more episodic from the 1990s, precisely during Myanmar's emergence as an economy.

Unpacking the management of the political society marks two contrasts concerning the organisation of the political economy. Table 3 illustrates a pattern that clarifies that the accumulation economy was organised through pauperisation under the initial phase of state-owned capitalism. These arrangements were followed by series of military invasions known as Operation for Clean and Beautiful Nation. First, a pattern of deprivations was deployed for all communities irrespectively. For example, it is argued that the nationalisation of agricultural land also impacted the small landholders of the Buddhist Rakhine community (Jones, 2014 a&b). However, discrimination has been structured by placing the Rohingya community against the poor Rakhine Buddhist community as their settlement process has been organised to involve the confiscated land from Rohingyas in Rakhine state (Habiburahman and Ansel, 2019). Second, for Rohingya, their dispossession of land and identity and imposition of restrictions, sanctions, and suspensions organise their everyday lived experience in camps.

Drawing on our analysis as illustrated in Table 3, we think that the conditions of an emerging economy and the search for an authentic nation are intertwined. As perfect pretexts, such conditions demonstrate that the logic of elimination intersects with expulsion, eviction, and extinction. The strategy of substituting evolves as a management approach. For instance, there was a sharp growth in land acquisition in 1990, 2006, and 2012 (2014). Simultaneously, traditional and extractive sectors and land governance have been consolidated under the state-sponsored capitalists (Jones, 2014b). In tandem, Rohnigyas' frequent sporadic exodus to Bangladesh became normalised. The logic of elimination that tends to assimilate differences was not the condition for organising internal colonialism through arranging the resettlement of Rakhines.

There is considerable evidence that assumptions that form the basis of politico-economic analysis tend to normalise by homogenising and thus obfuscating how the economy and communities are managed in reality. Here we turn to an example like an analysis that draws on the idea of ceasefire capitalism (Jones 2014a&b, Wood,2011. The tendency is to presume that despotic regimes are despotic equally for all, so all actors involved in conflicts are equally equal. This incites an understanding that justifies violence by labelling all violence as conflicts. Thus, arguably, state-organised violence to fight insurgency and ethnic conflicts becomes justified. The pattern of analysis is awkwardly silent regarding the assumptions under which such conflicts arise.

Interestingly, in such analysis, neutrality is demanded as the essential requirement in the directives and actions of INGOs and the UN. There is no doubt that the role of INGOs and the UN has been increasingly controversial: we see the UN has limited its role in humanitarian operations such as the distribution of food aid and minimum health care in Rohingya camps in Rakhine state (Lee,20201. Instead of addressing the violation of human rights, the UN manages by substituting its role to merely managing basic human requirements. Yet, it is also criticised for its controversial role towards the poor Rakhine Buddhist community, who are also victims of the state policy for marginalisation (Jones, 2014b). A consistent effort is observed in offering 'exact facts' regarding Rohingya and Myanmar's governing approach and political economy. However, such efforts effectively and constructively tend to normalise violent attacks by the 'poor Rakhine Buddhists' on NGOs conveyors involved in relief distribution in Rohingya camps, and in a similar fashion convey the view that organised disparity impacts all equally.

There are three useful ways of understanding the centrality and gravity of these constructions. First, the militarised ideology invoked the idea of reclaiming authentic identity, and thereby entrenching despotism in managing politics in general, as well as categorically managing dominant and dominated factions of the political society. Second, drawing on this, the deprivation of basic human requirements has been organised. Third, within these practices during the political transition, deep engagement and sustained support are marked from civil society organisations like the UN, INGOs, and ILOs [ see Table :3]. Such support is essential in managing accountability and thus legitimacy for protecting foreign, specifically state-initiated, bi-lateral investments.

In this context, we take the Commission as an example. Its formation shows how the logic of substitution works in addressing accountability to coordinate the required legitimacy. The Suu Kyi government approved and allowed the Commission, led by a retired UN bureaucrat, to review the situation in Myanmar. It shows the government's capacity to substitute as it denied giving access the means to investigate the condition of the Rakhine state to the UN Human Rights Commission delegates. As usual, the Commission recommends that Myanmar should

look for ways for reconciliation to prevent ethnic conflicts. With its failure to acknowledge genocide by calling it ethnic conflict, the Commission balances state-orchestrated violence such as fighting insurgency – precisely countering the attack of the Arakan Revolutionary Force. Thus, the Commission legitimises carnages under the democratic process and approves what happened during the military regimes against the ethnic-minority communities in general, and specifically the genocide against the Rohingya community. The logic of substitution evolves as a management principle that provides moral legitimacy and social compliance for the management of Myanmar's emerging economies for a democratic government. Accordingly, the Commission counters M. Zarni's (2014 : 683) persistent claim that Rohingya are the victims of genocide carried out jointly by the state and anti-Muslim ultra-nationalists among the Buddhist Bamar people, by referring to what has been delineated in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951: 280). Indeed, at the core of the deployed methods is communalism which has been meticulously cultivated. Hence commencing a week after the Commission submitted its Report, from August 2017–2018, more than 400,000 Rohingya had to flee to Bangladesh. Currently, one million Rohingya have been living in various camps in Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh –the world's largest refugee settlement (Nur, 2018).

The need to uncover the political economy of ongoing slow genocide necessitates a closer examination of the politics of the economy and politics relating to it in three ways. First, the Commission has played its symbolic role as civil society organisation to safeguard the conditions and circumstances in legitimate interface and fair exchange in bi-lateral and multi-lateral investments. The investment pattern indicates a predominance of investment by graduated emerging economies like China, India, Vietnam, and Singapore (Mothaer, 2020) Out of our situated concerns, we analyse Australia's policy on Myanmar and the Rohingya community as an example to gather insights about interaction among the states, business, and civil society organisations. Our analyses reveal that the logic of substitution is entrenched in the workings of the Australian government's unrelenting effort to justify its trade and defence relations with the Suu Kyi government. Although it asked the Suu Kyi government to enact the Commission's recommendations, Australia is the third-largest donor state to the UNHCR for managing Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. The Australian government's bilateral defence cooperation support (Slee, 2018) continued until the recent military coup in February 2021. It shows that the trade and military cooperation appeared as legitimate and inalienable issues to serve the democratic political government of Myanmar as its military has counter-insurgency operations. Such state-level support legitimised the Suu Kyi government's stance in doubting the UN's governing approach, and hence it rejected the UN Human Rights Council Report of 2018.

Secondly, it is crucially important to take adequate note of the involvement of institutions in marshaling various Rohingya identities, as these directly or indirectly affect their ability to acquire legal status as legal, economic agents in a legally functioning economy. And, within these workings, the politico-economic structure characterises how constructively Rohingya and their lifeworld contribute to the economy. Our analysis reveals first the functioning of the 'rehabilitation economy'. This includes the day-to-day management of camps – deployment of local NGOs, employment of NGO employees, involvement of various vendors and agencies in setting up the camps, and distribution of relief. According to Chowdhury (2021), although foreign consultants are expensive to hire, more than 1000 foreign consultants have been working in camps in Bangladesh. The rehabilitation economy functions based on life in camps, and drawing on Sanyal can be classified as a part of the 'need economy'. Second, we see that organising incarceration, detention, and sanction has contributed to developing a survival economy that

tends to both be illegal and support the functioning of the formal economy. There is considerable evidence about the development of sophisticated human trafficking networks using them as slave labour. Their involvement is found in Thailand's 7.8 billion USD seafood industry (Kelly, 2018), and in drug peddling in the Bangladesh camps. We thereby draw an assumption that perhaps the Rohingyas' life in camps supports the 'surveillance economy' – that is, the exponential growth in the state-military expenditure on safety and security in Myanmar and Bangladesh. Third, the stateless people in camps are also part of a 'consumer economy'. Chowdhury (2021) notes that their consumption was highlighted when (for security reasons) the Bangladesh government restricted phone services from 4G/3G to 2G. His study further illustrates that the functioning of the rehabilitation economy has been increasingly affecting living standards in Cox's Bazar for the locals and contribute to the disparity between native locals in general and those who have been running hotels and renting their homes to NGOs. Thus there has been structuring conflicts and social tensions between refugees and the locals alarmingly. Meanwhile, Rohingya have been subjected to a suspension of their right to claim themselves as human beings who could be part of the social-moral-legal and normal lifeworld. As Chowdhury (2021, p. 920) suggests, they are easier targets for drugs and trafficking businesses and exploitation (e.g., sex-work, abduction, rape).

Indeed, the deployed ways and means that make slow and ongoing genocide function demonstrate that the logic of extinction is embodied in managing by substitution for constituting capability deprivations. Thus, there has been the organisation of Rohingyas' life in camps. Hence Rohingyas' human potentiality can never be realised, no matter where their location. However, we have to admit that there has been the creation of space like camps and bodies for which we do not need who to be accountable.

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

We began this essay with a quotation from Sen about the slow genocide and the Rohingya experience of denial of access regarding basic material and non-material issues. We situated the case at the intersection of development regimes and (re)configuration of the state apparatuses. The fundamental questions we explore in this paper are: (i) how these mechanisms have been structured and interwoven into the governing system; and (ii) what accumulation arises out of it. Our study shows three forms of organisation of the political economy of genocide within the workings of the development regimes and neoliberal economic orders. Within these workings, the political-economic structuring demonstrates how the logic of substitutability is embodied in liberal political ideas. This logic as a principle of management is deployed to organise racial capitalism.

Our analyses first reveal that military invasions and the militarised ideology have organised Rohingyas' displacement and expulsion. This ideology has internalised liberal political notions: nation, equality, and the identity as a citizen. Thus, the emerged despotic ideology invokes substitutability as a mechanism to justify and legitimise structural genocide by substituting collective and common perceptions with what should be perceived as truth. Influenced by Sen, we argue that social formations cannot be governed by the enacting of law that has been manufactured to be perceived as if it contains the truth of history. Nevertheless, this is exactly what happened in the case of the Rohingya community with the 1982 Citizenship Act. The Act has reconfigured their life into a constant state of dispossession through organising their displacement. Drawing on Sanyal (2007), we infer herein a form of accumulation has been organised by managing restrictions, sanctions, denial, prohibition, suspension, and expulsion of the Rohingya community from the social-formal economy. By doing so, there has been an

appropriation of the Rohingya community's capability to function as human beings. Alternatively, there have been arrangements of certain capabilities, authority relations and institutions based on the active consent of the dominant factions of the political society. Disentangling such mechanisms reveals the constitution of spaces where specific communities reside under regulations and constant surveillance – at the borderline of legality and illegality. Mohanty (2011) suggests that the lifeworld of the refugees living in camps under surveillance offers an opportunity for another form of management of their economy in intersection with the formal economy. She therefore argues that militarisation strategies are deeply linked with the organisation of a criminalised survival economy. Our study evidenced that Rohingyas' lives and, therefore their bodies, are intensively regulated. Consequently, there has been the creation of new values in exchange for naked life itself. The state apparatuses are operationalised to control the mobility of the Rohingya, while the Rohingya create value through participation in the criminalised or illegal/illegitimate economy. In a similar vein, these expelled people, whose legitimacy to represent has been a constant struggle, are integrated within the workings of the rehabilitation economy.

Second, our study shows that the emergence as an economic project tends to be viewed as a political project first. The organisation of slow and ongoing genocide has deployed a method of constituting perceptions and understanding, underpinned by presumptions about purity and authenticity. Such constructions can embrace all aspects of social and individual life and generate social-ethical compliance for the management of an economy. It is important to note the repoliticising of managing the economy of accumulation by managing global perceptions. In particular, the involvement of the Commission led by Kofi Annan shows the CSO's instrumental role in managing indemnity for organising regimes of terror. Alternatively, the Commission validates its relevance in safeguarding the condition of accountability in the politics of democracy. Accordingly, substitution evolves as a principle that organises expulsion and killing of non-accountable bodies like Rohingyas and their expulsion in non-accountable spaces like camps – zones that have been created in between the state or states. To say that substitution as a principle legitimises despotic regimes in the democratic transition of the state.

Third, Rohingyas' expulsion and eviction show the intricacies of the logic of elimination in organising an economy of accumulation through pauperisation that leads to extinction. Unmasking this logic shows that extinction is delineated by annihilating the Rohingyas' political and economic endowments covering entitlements and rights, most importantly, those which are inherently linked to an individual's capability. The Rohingyas' expulsion and eviction demonstrate that cultural and political identity constantly shifts as a category for those who belong to ethnic and racial minority communities. Clearly, the demolishing of the Rohingyas' ethnic identity and simultaneously their eviction implies the loss of their collective past and disconnection from the land/space to which they belong. Undeniably the Rohingya community is neither a part of the state, nor a part of communities of Myanmar, nor are they capable of having a life as a legal body. Explicitly Rohingyas are not allowed to live as normal human beings who have the freedom to move around and be actively involved in social-economic, cultural, and political life. The regimes have reconfigured their lives and have left them with no choice of having a legitimate life and a life that is recognised with rights, including the right to participate in social spheres. Our analyses evidenced that the logic of substitution is entrenched in liberal values, and as a principle, it manages capitalist development by managing poverty. In parallel, racial organisation and centralisation of capital are crystallised by transformative features of social relations that mark the alliance between the ruling class and dominant part of communities as the political society – Burmese-Bamars and Buddhists.

In offering our views that draw on our analyses on genocide, we argue that the organisation of state capitalism under the development regime demonstrates its capacity to constitute structural genocide by organising perpetual indeterminacy in terms of status for the de facto stateless Rohingya people. Sanyal identifies that capital negotiates the space of the dispossessed to create the conditions of its own reproduction (2007). Following his lead, our analyses of slow and ongoing genocide and classification of the capitalist development illustrate that the logic of governing is grounded in social cost-benefit analysis. Drawing on Sanyal, we argue that annihilation of citizenship status and expulsion demonstrate a deprivation of capability that characterises developmental capitalism wherein centralisation of capital organises pre-accumulation simultaneously. As the emergent economy arises, the principle of managing through substitution is demonstrated through a formation of arrays of economies – the economies of rehabilitation, survival, surveillance, and consumption – out of those expelled non-accountable bodies in non-accountable space, that is in camps.

Based on our lived experiences, we detail our modalities on slow and ongoing genocide. We think our study brings further to light the geopolitical dynamics that embody the politico-economic approach in conceptualising slow and ongoing genocide. Our modalities explicitly demonstrate that the process of knowing and presenting violence like genocide calls for contextualising the facts because the oppressed and marginalised body invokes their past. [I am a Kalar.] We draw on the concept of situated solidarity that considers the practice of knowing, being, and doing by radicalising our vulnerabilities. Our analyses evidenced how we combine exploration of broader affinities and linkages, grounded in recognition and deeply entwined with the land, locations, and spatial connections/disconnections (Nagar, 2015). In hindsight, our sense of responsibility is invoked by our felt entitlements. It evokes an intuitive understanding in us that our collaborative research to represent our experience of genocide as a way of seeking justice.

Wolfe bases his analyses on the logic of elimination to question the relevance of liberal values like equality and equity in producing knowledge, and thus he concludes that knowledge politics culturally justify the structural invasion (Abu-Lughod, 2020). We argue that legitimacy is the crucial condition, but the capacity to substitute as a principle is embodied in liberal values. Therefore, actions are always contextualised and legitimate. For example, the functioning of liberal democracy in developmental states explicitly marks that citizenship status is not permanent for minority communities, and the condition of legitimacy depends on managing consent. As academics, we need to take different narratives of accountability that entail legitimacy. A growing body of research argues for participation of affected peripheral stakeholders, drawing on concepts like political CSR and corporate citizenship (Matten, and Crane 2005, Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). Thus, this research is grounded in the condition of legitimacy and highlights the intrinsic relevance of the role of business in social transformation. In contrast, Banerjee (2011) questions that legitimacy by highlighting the dialectical relationships between the state, business, civil society, and political society. His arguments emphasise the agency and the dignity we should seek and that are embodied in the functioning of political societies. Eventually, both views tend to be reductive as these discussions tend to privilege liberal narratives of accountability. Banerjee's sanitised accounts on the functioning of the political society homogenise our understanding by omitting particularities of its dynamics. As scholars we are preoccupied by the thought of decontextualising knowledge, as we need to make a legitimate claim. Here our study unpacks how substitutability intersects with the logic of extinction; therefore, the operationalised model of the state, business, and civil society can relentlessly create non-accountable spaces like

camps and non-accountable bodies like IDPs or expelled people. So we think any transformative changes in social relations need to be assessed by analysing the emerging economy and then disentangling the functioning of who governs and who provides consent on how who could be ruled and, if required, could be expelled.

To make concluding remarks, we offer our views in three distinctive ways, and thus we also lay out the path for future research. Firstly, we discuss developmental states, but South Asia as an empirical site clearly illustrates that communalism is entangled with the emergence of corporate capitalism. The militarised invasions and the state of emergency have constituted a militarised form of democracy. Therefore, to unpack the organisation of racial capitalism, we need to examine the nexus between the states and their despotic regimes; and changes related to their social relations in collusion with the functioning of far-right factions. Obviously, regional forms of organising capitalism are more overtly violent in aligning with the neoliberal economic order.

Secondly, there has been an organising of life in camps. We note how substitution generates and justifies the creation of a non-accountable space like camps for the documented people for whom neither NGOs nor the state as institutions are accountable. The absolute power of those institutions in Rohingya camps has evoked outrage in Chowdhury (2021). Hence out of felt responsibility, he suggests that business should unlock the potential of noncooperative space such as camps. Providing work to them has constructive implications as all human beings seek to find dignity as economic agents. Therefore, like Chowdhury, we think inclusive business practices can structurally and overwhelmingly positively affect Rohingyas' lives, so why not then unlock the potential by unlocking the chain of non-accountable bodies like Rohingyas', who have been in camps for 40 years? Currently, there is intense debate and demand on business to disrupt and transform situated disparity experienced by communities and achieve SDG16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions for inclusive business practice. We argue that the conceptualisation of capitalism in these terms brings into visibility a new political imagination in postcolonial states.

Thirdly, there has been a persistent call for decolonising the knowledge regimes, which has turned into a call for decolonising the university. It is critical to scrutinise the political-economic orderings of knowledge regimes and then the contextual relevance of such a call. Clearly, South Asia as a site suggests our discussions of decolonisation should be reframed in light of demilitarisation theoretically and in practice. Drawing on Mir and Greenwood (2020), we argue that cultivating such thoughts would give researchers grounding, heft, and direction to broaden their scope beyond the identity project and enable them to raise relational and reflexive questions. Herein we think using the lens of political society in analysing the relations of non-accountable space of non-accountable bodies might have two productive effects: first turning a noncooperative space into a collaborative space and, second, qualifying them for representation.



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