

(1) Development

(a) Trend of Clashes and Fighting

Co-ordinated attacks and special operation

For allies- their strengths are strategic, comprised of various groups, familiar with the geography, deployment capabilities, mobility, logistics, timely, and well-preparedness.

Weakness- After five days of consecutive waging, their tempo is a bit low.

For the SAC

They are much weaker than the usual form, their team form is out to be exact in Northern Shan State in the early days of fighting. It seems some mechanism is dented and lower levels of the Army circle growing disappointed in the Army chief or motivation and confidence lack of their leaders due to the present situation in Myanmar. It may be psychological factors.

(b) Attack types, Strategy, and Tactic

Roughly estimated, round about a total of 120 incidents were tracked from October 27 to November 3, 2023.

Skirmish+ Raid + Clash+ attacks are altogether 100.

175 incidents as of November 7

Strategic- The Allies combined two methods of warfare: the conventional strategy and the guerrilla strategy, which relies on a periodic punishment strategy to induce the government to overreact. But of the three Brotherhood groups, two groups, the MNDAA and the AA (excluding the TNLA/PSLF), shun human rights violations against locals and try to persuade the SAC regime and its allies and government officials to surrender by paying all surrenderers an allowance and showing their pictures and videos. Even the SAC says they are responding reasonably, but in reality, they are so horrified by the killing of civilians that they are firing artillery shells and air strikes.

Objectives and tactics_ The tactics of the Allies are threefold. Linked to a political goal

The first stage of their tactics is to eliminate (important roads, routes and bridges), the second stage is to operate and capture important bases or strategic infantry and the third stage is to capture an important objective such as Lauk Kai.

They attempted to isolate Lauk Kai and expanded their territory along the Chinese border to be able to utilize their presence militarily and commercially in the future; at the same time, they cut off the potential reinforcement routes of the Accord Army.

They managed to cut the connecting roads to the Chinese border and cut off three routes leading to the Kokang area in the initial stage.

They use various tactics on the battlefield: ambushes and raids, subversion and sabotage.

Numerous drone attacks on the army's firebases or the LIB have meant that the army has been unable to react quickly and has retreated into bunkers. EVO II Dual 640T Enterprise V3 drones are used. (thermal imaging sensor and visual camera, easy to interpret temperature data). They Say their political goal is to put military dictators to rout. Their logic is the military conflict itself can help mobilize the local population.

Please check below the mapping all three roads blue are under the control of MNDAA-led allies.

1027 Operation in Northern Myanmar

- 🏠 Armed bases involved
- ⚙️ Key conflict locations
- Road blocked by insurgents



Source: International Crisis Group

BBC

(Map.1)

While thousands of troops capture and attack the strong army base in eastern Lashio, groups of TNLA and MDY PDF hold up the army convoy or a possible reinforcement line in western and southern Lashio. Regimental Battalion No. 101 is the main army eliminator along the road from Mandalay to MUSE. But they cannot get past the town of Nawng Cho in the Gode Twin area (the westernmost town in Shan State along the

China-Myanmar trade route) on Nov. 6. This would be a stroke of luck for the allies, as all three main roads connecting southern Shan and northern Shan are mostly under the control of the SSPP/SSA, who are not involved in the current joint attacks but maintain good relations with the three ethnic brotherhood armed groups. There is no road along the Ruli River from the northern part of Mandalay Division to the upstream area of Northern Shan. On Friday morning, the TNLA captured the Man Wein Bridge across the Ruli River between Shan and Kachin States, so the SAC's hope for reinforcements from Kachin State or along the Ruli River is almost over. (But now, the SAC's force took it again)

The SAC and its allies's side have to reorganize, rally, and collect the soldiers of the light infantry battalion or regional main command withdrawing from outposts, camps, and checkpoints. The first of five consecutive days is the worst moment in the history of the Tatmadaw for several decades. Perhaps the most significant incident was the surrender of 44 soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion 143 on October 30 and the drone attack on Mogn Koe, a border town and former headquarters of the communist rebels on November 6, an army Brigadier General and Colonel rank died at this attack.

The Tatmadaw could only rely on the air force and the firepower of the base stations while trying hard not to let the light infantry battalion fall into enemy hands. Their reinforcements still relied on air transportation, including the reinforcement of Lauk Kai and Kun Long (A currently fierce fighting strategic town for both sides). The SAC paid the price in the first week of attacks for relying too much on the militia groups for security after the coup in northern Shan. The members of these groups are not professional soldiers, but join the militias as a matter of habit to earn a living.

(c) Tug Of War Balance

As they are trying to maintain logistics and reinforcement routes along the China-Myanmar road with a regiment, they are unable to launch counterattacks in northern Shan State so far. (On Nov. 5, some army counterattacks began in Hsen Wi Township with airstrikes and long-range attacks by MLRS. But they could not make the one collapsed bridge unbridgeable and their counteroffensive did not get through until Nov. 8)

(Compared to the attacks by the KIA+ TNLA+ AA+ MNDAA alliance groups in 2016, the forces of the ethnic allies carried out several offensives at high speed in the initial phase, but after five days the Myanmar army managed to repel them)

Their ability to react, their movements, and their adaptation to the requirements of the situation are too limited. But some of the Tatmadaw bases are still known for rebel offensives.

Mong Kyet, a bank of the Salween River, which the Allies tried to capture since October 27 but failed on November 3. It is a vital artery for the Allies' weapons supply, as the east bank is the UWSA's area of control. If Mong Kyet and Kun Long become allies, the entire Kokang area would be freer because a military strategic regional military command base there can threaten Chin Shwe Haw's firepower from a long distance.

In Hsenwi, the crossroads town in northern Shan State, although the Allies captured the entire town and collapsed a bridge on the highway, the Regional Operations Command No. (16) used the human shield method and was still able to hold its ground against enemy attacks. In Hsenwi Township, the situation is much worse than in Kun Long because two thousand internally displaced people are housed near the army compound and some troops were deployed there last week. This is preventing the Allies from taking advantage of the delays.

Above all, numerous significant strategic cities and bases have already fallen to the rebels, while certain battalions or garrisons have proven to be difficult to capture thus far.

For the SAC's losses, it is intriguing why certain battalions or soldiers are able to withstand and continue fighting back while other outposts and troops succumbed or failed easily.

Whether the army is made up of volunteers or conscripts is one of its fundamental traits. While volunteers are likely to support the position taken by their senior officers, conscripts are more likely to sympathize with the broader revolutionary cause. A soldier who turned himself into the rebels is seen cursing at the Army head in video footage. According to several close-to-military generals, the Northeast's recent fights have failed early.

The current coordinated assaults by rebel coalition sides throughout a significant portion of Northern Shan involve at least 10,000 men.

But following 1027, there was a security vacuum that led to several well-planned attacks around the country.

At least twenty townships nationwide did not see fighting until November 3. These included the townships of Kachin, eight townships in Upper Sagaing, several townships bordering Mandalay Division with Shan State, Karen State, Shan, and the northern part of Magway Division.

However, as 1027 is a year-long well-preparedness plan led by the MNDAA, it is uncertain how it will be connected to other regions of the country's operations. (Especially Weak leadership of

the NUG led movements). Furthermore, the Three Brotherhoods and SAC sides must accept China's reality. The PRC Chinese government probably won't put up with the interruption of its investment projects and important commercial routes for much longer.

Both the UWSA and the NDAA indicated that they will keep up their neutral positions. Nonetheless, it is presently assumed that UWSA and NDAA Mongla are military allies, with three brotherhoods showing kindness and sympathy to rebel soldiers.

Besides, the UWSA vowed to retaliate if its territory or airspace were to be assaulted, its declaration of neutrality essentially demonstrated support for the anti-junta revolutionary organizations.


(D) Major Conflicts in area/ Cities and towns/ Bridges/ Seized- Control-and- Contested

Fighting is occurring in at least 14 townships (about 20 towns) of Northern Shan state and one township of Eastern Mandalay. But the alliance's purpose is quite clear. To seize several towns including the China-Myanmar border which are good for settlement or military HQ to form. Within 12 Days, the brotherhood already seized Phaung Sai, Pan Sai, Mong Koe, and Chin Shwe Haw towns. (Remark: Pan Sai is only 80% controlled of the rebel and remain a major strategic post as of November 7). Although the urban areas of Kun Long and Hsen Wi are now controlled by MNDAA-led rebel blocs but remain to seize two major Regional Strategic Commandments of the Army. The alliance would have complete control of the Kokang region if Kun Long town fell and Ho Pang, the only town of the Wa region under the SAC control, future is more uncertain.

Crossroad town of Hsenwi too. Rebels control the eastern and Northern parts of Town but still remain ROC (16) three miles away from town. Owing 13 in a row battles fiercely, corpses' putrid come up into town, some locals say.

Major roads are still under the control of the rebel alliance forces.

Major turning points of their advantages are capturing Chin Shwe Haw, collapsing the Hsen Wi bridge, and Nant Tip Bridge is a crucial movement for the three brotherhood allies that could lead to major roads connecting with China border both the two important military and economy under the control of the alliance forces.



Map (2). Several ethnic armed groups control and dominant areas, and the current situation of the battlefield of Northern Shan State


Green- are the completed control towns of under three brotherhoods alliance

Blue- are the major contested towns.

Red- are the collapsed bridges for military advantage positions.


Yellow- is the Airport and army's northeast command.

(Remark, Two of Crossbench: KIO/KIA and SSPP/SSA are not in line with the SAC/Regime.)



Map (3). Army Stations through Northern Shan.

Altogether 87 infantryries



Mongton	BGF 1007, M37 Mongton
Mongyawng	BGF 1008
Tachilek	BGF 1009, M33 Mong Hai, M34 Mekong Border Security Battalion, M35 Nampong/Lo Taw Khan
Matman	BGF 1010
Konkyan	BGF 1006
Kunlong	BGF 1006, M20 Kunlong Special Combat Police Force
Manton	M4 Manton
Namhkan	M5 Namhkan Myo Ma, M6 Pang Hsay (Pan Say)
Namtu	M7 Namtu Myo Ma
Muse	M8 Monekoe, M9 Kyu Koke, M10 Mong Yu, M11 Mong Paw
Kutkai	M12 Kutkai Special Militia Group, M13 Pang Hseng, M14 Tarmoenye, M15 Manje, M16 Shaw Haw, M17 Special Militia Group, M18 Nam Hpat Kar (Nampaka), M19 Kawng Kha
Lashio	M21 Manpang
Hsipaw	M22 Mong Khay, M23 Sein Kyawt (Hseng Keow)
Mong Yai	M24 Mong Hin Mong Ha

Map (4) Militias and Border Guard forces station throughout Northern Shan

(2) Potential Ultimate Outcomes

It is too soon to judge the Northern Shan 1027 Operation's outcomes. On the other hand, several possible situations and results might be predicted beforehand. It is dependent upon various things. Broadly speaking, the factors included issues and policies related to the country's bordering China, political atmosphere, actors' attitudes and deeds, military prowess, and other regions.

Regarding military matters, both this week—the second week of November—and the next week will be critical for both sides. As they tenaciously defend a few important towns in the eastern regions of Lashio, Tatmadaw will attempt to establish highways and routes connecting for its reinforcement and supply line.

Whether or not the Brotherhood can shut off and discourage traffic, seize strategically important encampments, or seize Tatmadaw forces at the same time, these events and acts will determine how to weaken and depress the troops of the SAC government.

As a result, the Brotherhood would have greater strategic control over Lashio's northeastern and eastern areas. SAC promises to maintain control over important towns like Mong Koe, which is situated on the Chinese-Myanmar border, and Kun Long, the entry town to the Kokang and Wa area. (Notes: After battling for seven years to get there, the MNDAA flag is been flown once more at the Mong Koe Border Checkpoint). The SaC's maximum concession is that might form a coalition government between the partisans of Bai Xuoqian and the Mndaa Kokang rebel.

But ever since Bai Xuoqian assumed power, the Kokang SAZ's officials have been unable to maintain control over the whole area, which has resulted in the rise of gangs and mafias. For the people of Kokang, the MDAA Kokang Resistance troops, and probably the local administrations of neighboring China, this is not a pleasant outcome. There's no law and order at all. These situations are not at all like the NDAA (National Democracy Alliance Army) Mongla, which governs the Mongla region in eastern Shan. Out of the three areas (Kokang, Wa, and Mongla), as well as the entire Shan state, Mongla has the finest security, stability, and law and order.

Kokang's pro-military factions have a history of supporting Juntas and dictators. Lo Hsing Han was the most well-known of them. He was also a business magnate and the king of heroin. Yunnan is not content. Under the SAC rule, thousands of offenders were deported back to Yunnan by Kokang SAZ. Because Yunnan prefers to be in charge of the online fraud sector rather than these employees. Bai and his supporters are heavily active in the world of internet fraud.

The most likely scenario for the military position is that when only the Laukkai remain in Northern East Shan land was fallen into rebels alliance, it would be interesting to know what the SAC would think about the Laukkai in terms of whether they wage war using careless carpet bombing near the China border, which would have a significant impact, or whether they would use it to destroy luxurious buildings. Nevertheless, Min Aung Hlaing and the other army elites are calling for their destruction. China's involvement in the intervention gets significant at this stage. Beijing did not choose a side and has continued to uphold its non-interference stance, even urging both parties to engage in discussion.

The SAC is currently getting ready to repel Laukkai. They have at least a thousand troops reinforced by helicopters. According to Bai's latest argument, he attempted to console the inhabitants of Laukkai while summoning about 4,000 warriors to battle.

From a realpolitik standpoint, the MNDAA holds ace cards as negotiating chips, whether it is over the China-Burma rail way project or the ongoing border trade concerns. Each month's trading volume of over billions of dollars is significant for Yunan Province, the national economy, and the SAC regime.

Given that the fighting has been getting worse for months, there's a chance that the massive IDP and refugee issue at the China border is causing further problems for the people involved.

In an effort to incite hatred toward the three brotherhoods, the Myanmar army is currently bombing and randomly shooting the villages and towns of Kachin and Shan. As a component, these are pitted against one another as divide-and-rule strategies and dividends. Another technique is Human Shields.

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